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SELF-BLINDNESS AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
Matthew Parrott 
(Draft) 
 
Abstract: Many philosophers hold constitutive theories of self-knowledge in the sense that 
they think either that a person’s psychological states depend upon her having true beliefs 
about them, or that a person’s believing that she is in a particular psychological state depends 
upon her actually being in that state. One way to support this type of view can be found in 
Shoemaker’s well-known argument that an absurd condition, which he calls 'self-blindness', 
would be possible if a subject’s psychological states and her higher order beliefs about them 
were wholly distinct existences. A second reason to endorse a constitutive theory is the 
widespread conviction that first-person access is epistemically special. In this essay, I shall 
argue that even if self-blindness is impossible the best explanation for this does not deny 
that a person’s psychological states are wholly distinct from her beliefs about them. I shall 
then attempt to account for the distinctiveness of first-person access on the basis of 
fundamental features of rational cognition. One advantage of this account over constitutive 
theories of self-knowledge is that it is better placed to explain our fallibility and ignorance.    
 
 
In order for me to know about another person's psychological states, I must observe her in 
some way.  I have to see what she is doing or listen to what she is saying before I can know 
what is on her mind. Because observation is, either direct or indirectly, necessary for my 
becoming aware of another person's mind, I can be, and sometimes am, mistaken about 
what other people are thinking. Notably, it seems possible for me to be wrong about what 
another person is thinking or feeling even in cases where my beliefs about the other person’s 
mind are fully justified. The possibility of this kind of perception-based error suggests that 
another person's psychological state is independent from my beliefs about it. In Hume's 
words, the two seem to be distinct existences.  
 Things are different in my own case. I do not normally rely on sensory perception in 
order to know what I think, or want, or intend. Instead, it seems that I have a special kind of 
epistemic access to my own psychological states. This first-person access is unavailable to 
other people. They can never know about my psychological states in the special way that I 
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typically do. However, having this special mode of access makes it much less clear whether 
my psychological states are wholly distinct from my beliefs about them. Indeed, many 
philosophers think the two are not wholly distinct existences.1 For example, Matthew Boyle 
denies that, ‘being in a given mental state M and believing oneself to be in M are two distinct 
psychological conditions.’ (2011, pg. 235) Instead, Boyle thinks the two are simply different 
aspects, or ‘ways of conceiving’, the very same psychological state. Thus, on Boyle’s view, 
the relation between a subject's psychological state and her higher-order belief about it is 
identity.  
In recent years, several philosophers have explicitly defended ‘constitutive theories’ 
of self-knowledge. The majority of these theorists deny that a subject's psychological states 
are wholly distinct from her own higher-order beliefs about them.2 Instead, they maintain 
either that part of what it is to be in a psychological state M is to believe that one is in M , or 
that part of what it is to believe that one is in M is to actually be in M.3  
                                                 
1 I intend ‘wholly distinct’ to mean that there are no necessary connections between the two entities. As Wilson 
(2010) shows, there are weaker senses of ‘distinct’ which allow for ‘distinct existences’ to stand in certain kinds 
of necessary relations to one another.       
2 In addition to Boyle, constitutive theories are proposed by Bilgrami (2006; 2010), Coliva (2008); Gertler 
(2001), Heal (2001), Horgan and Kriegel (2007), Rodl (2007), Shoemaker (1994; 2012), and Zimmerman (2006). 
An important exception to what I say in this essay is Crispin Wright, who in various papers (1992; 1998; 2012) 
has defended a kind of anti-realist, 'deflationary', account of self-knowledge that he sometimes refers to as a 
'constitutive' theory (although in recent work he concedes that this label may be misleading). Because Wright's 
view concerns constitutive conditions on the way we treat avowals of psychological states, it is not committed 
to denying that a subject's psychological states are wholly distinct from her higher-order beliefs about them. It 
therefore need not be opposed to the thesis I defend in this essay.   
3 Rayo (2009) calls ‘part of what it is to be’ claims like these ‘semi-identities’ and argues that they entail 
sentences with trivial truth conditions. So if either of these semi-identities were true for psychological states 
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Yet there are different ways in which a constitutive theorist can think of the 
underlying relation that holds between a subject's psychological states and her higher-order 
beliefs about them. Like Boyle, one could think of the relation as identity; that is, one could 
think that my believing that P just is my believing that I believe that P. Alternatively, one 
could think of the relation as a type of essential mereological relation. For example, one 
could think that my higher-order belief that I believe that P is an essential part of what it is to 
believe that P and so not wholly distinct. Or, following Sydney Shoemaker, one could think 
that the belief that I believe that P ‘has the belief that p as an essential part,’ such that ‘its 
possession cannot survive the loss of the belief that p.’ (2009, pg. 42)4   
Regardless, what these different constitutive theories have in common is their 
opposition to the natural thought that being in a psychological state is one thing and having 
a true belief about it is another thing. I propose to capture this thought by negating two 
claims:  
                                                                                                                                                 
and higher-order beliefs about them, then we should expect that sentences like ‘if I believe P, then I believe 
that I believe P’ will have trivial truth conditions (cf. Rayo, 2013).  This suggests, as Boghossian (1989) argued, 
that constitutive theories make self-knowledge neither a cognitive nor an epistemic achievement (however, see 
Rayo (2009) for an argument that acquiring knowledge of trivial claims can be a cognitive achievement).    
4 In his (1994), Shoemaker spells out the relevant relation in terms of the realizers of psychological states and of 
higher-order beliefs. In fact, he presents two proposals. First, he claims that a’s being in M and a’s believing that 
a is in M might have different core realizations but ‘their total realizations overlap in a certain way.’ (pg.288)  
Second, he proposes that ‘it might be that they have the same core realization and that the total realization of 
the first-order state is a proper part of the total realization of the first-person belief that one has it.’ (pg. 288)  It 
is worth noting that since Shoemaker clearly intends for the relation between one’s psychological states and 
one’s true higher order beliefs about them to hold with necessity, he can’t be thinking of either overlap or 
proper parthood as contingent relations, which is perhaps why he frames his proposals in terms of the ‘essence’ 
of psychological states.   
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Distinct Existence Thesis: For any subject a and psychological state M: (i) it is not the case that 
part of what it is for a to be in M is for a to believe (first-personally) that a is in M, and (ii) it 
is not the case that part of what it is for a to believe (first-personally) that a is in M is for a to 
be in M. 5  
 
Constitutive theories of self-knowledge, as I shall understand them, either explicitly deny or 
are committed to rejecting the Distinct Existence Thesis.  
Rejecting this thesis amounts to endorsing the idea that part of what it is to be in a 
certain kind of psychological state is to be in another kind of psychological state (namely, a 
true higher-order belief about the first-order state). Thus, constitutive theories are 
committed to some type of modal truth. This is because the ‘part of what it is to be’ operator 
                                                 
5 Constitutive theories are quite often characterized in terms of the following bi-conditional: necessarily, M(a) 
iff a believes that M(a). The problem with this is that the simple truth of the bi-conditional does not explain the 
relation between M(a) and a's higher order belief that M(a). There is therefore no reason why such a bi-
conditional could not turn out to be true of wholly distinct states, indeed no reason why it could not be 
accidentally true (for more on necessary connections holding between distinct states see Wilson (2010)). This is 
why Wright's account does not need to deny the Distinct Existence Thesis - the heart of his proposal is that the bi-
conditional is primitively true. In this formulation, the qualification 'first-personally' is needed to rule out 
impertinent counterexamples generated by the referential opacity of the belief context: for example, a case in 
which a cannot remember who she is, but nevertheless believes of herself that she is in M (for discussion of 
these sorts of cases see Rumfitt, 1994). For ease of prose, I will often leave the qualification implicit in what 
follows.    
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has modal implications.6  Specifically, the proposition negated in (i) entails the corresponding 
modal statement: necessarily (if a is in M, then a believes (first-personally) that a is in M).  
Similarly, the proposition denied in (ii) entails the corresponding modal statement: necessarily 
(if a believes (first-personally) that a is in M, then a is in M).  It follows that someone who 
rejects both conjuncts of the Distinct Existence Thesis would commit herself to the kind of 
necessary bi-conditional one finds explicitly endorsed by some constitutive theorists (e.g., 
Bilgrami (2006); Coliva (2012)).  By contrast, someone who accepts the Distinct Existence 
Thesis is committed to denying both of these modal claims and maintaining instead that any 
relation between a’s belief that she is M and a’s being in M is contingent.    
There are a couple of simple considerations that seem to speak in favor of the 
Distinct Existence Thesis. First there is Hume's doctrine that, since all psychological states are 
distinguishable in thought, ‘they may exist separately, and have no need of anything else to 
support their existence.’7  Prima facie, Hume's remark seems plausible. It seems that we can 
imagine a world in which a person believes that P without believing that she believes that P 
and also a world in which a person believes that she believes that P but actually does not. 
But if the Distinct Existence Thesis were false, these imagined scenarios would be impossible. 
Naturally, a contemporary philosopher might insist that Hume illegitimately presupposes 
that our imagination reliably indicates metaphysical possibility. But, even if we reject this 
presupposition, we might nonetheless think that being able to imagine these sorts of cases 
offers us at least some prima facie reason for thinking they are possible. After all, we might 
                                                 
6 This is plausibly because the operator picks out (partially) the identity conditions of the entity in question. 
Therefore, in claiming that part of what it is to be X is to be Y, one saying something stronger than that X is 
partially constituted by Y.        
7 Treatise 1.4.5.5.  
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note that in paradigm cases where part of what it is to be F is to be G, a world in which an 
object is F but not G seems to be completely unimaginable.  For instance, it is extremely 
difficult to imagine a scarlet object that is not also red.   
Secondly, it seems that we can be both ignorant of and mistaken about our own 
psychological states. We sometimes believe or desire something without believing that we do 
and we are sometimes wrong about our own beliefs and desires (Schwitzgebel, 2008; 
Snowdon, 2012).The combination of ignorance and error in this domain suggests that the 
Distinct Existence Thesis is true. More precisely, the possibility of ignorance suggests that clause 
(i) of the thesis is true and the possibility of error suggests that clause (ii) is true.   
Someone who is resistant to the Distinct Existence Thesis might think that one or both 
of these possibilities are exceedingly rare. That is, someone might think that, in ordinary 
circumstances, we are not ignorant of our own psychological states.  Similarly, one might 
think that in optimal conditions for self-reflection, we are not mistaken about our own 
psychological states (cf. Shoemaker, 1990). One might therefore think that, because they are, 
in some sense, non-standard cases, the mere possibilities of ignorance or of error could be 
accommodated by a view that denies the Distinct Existence Thesis. We shall return to this issue 
in section 5.    
 Neither of these two considerations amounts to a decisive argument for the Distinct 
Existence Thesis.  But I do think they suggest that it is plausible and intuitive.  In that case, 
however, one might wonder why many philosophers endorse constitutive theories.  One 
motivation is the widespread conviction that first-person access is epistemologically unique. 
Some philosophers worry that if the Distinct Existence Thesis were true, then our first-personal 
way of knowing would be based on causal relations but, in that case, it would no longer be 
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epistemically special or distinctive. It would too closely resemble ordinary perceptual 
knowledge of the external world.   
A second reason that one might endorse a constitutive theory is provided by a very 
influential argument presented by Sydney Shoemaker in a number of essays. Shoemaker 
argues that if a subject's psychological states were wholly distinct from her higher-order 
beliefs about them, then it would be possible for someone to suffer from a condition that he 
calls ‘self-blindness’.  A person is self-blind just in case she can know about her 
psychological states in only a third-personal way. Shoemaker argues that the possibility of 
self-blindness is absurd and that for this reason a subject’s psychological states cannot be 
wholly distinct from her true higher-order beliefs about them. If his argument were sound, 
then the impossibility of self-blindness would show that some type of constitutive theory 
must be true.  
The goal of this essay is to argue for a philosophical conception of self-knowledge 
that is consistent with the Distinct Existence Thesis, which is to say not a constitutive theory. In 
the first two sections, I shall argue that even if self-blindness is impossible the best 
explanation for this does not deny the Distinct Existence Thesis. In sections three and four, I 
draw on recent work on self-knowledge and rationality in order to present an account of 
first-person access that respects its epistemic distinctiveness but is also consistent with the 
Distinct Existence Thesis. The account I present is inspired by Richard Moran’s work on self-
knowledge and it maintains that a rational subject with the capacity to consciously self-
ascribe a psychological attitude must ordinarily take her attitudes to depend on her 
assessment of reasons. I shall argue that meeting this condition on rationality requires one to 
have a capacity for first-person access which is epistemically distinctive in two respects. In 
the final section of the essay, I consider an objection to this proposal and then argue that 
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because the Distinct Existence Thesis allows us to make better sense of self-ignorance and error 
we should prefer theories of self-knowledge that are consistent with it.    
 
1. Self-Blindness 
According to Shoemaker, ‘a self-blind creature would be one which has the conception of 
the various mental states, and can entertain the thought that it has this or that belief, desire, 
intention, etc., but which is unable to become aware of the truth of such a thought except in 
a third-person way.’ (1988, pg. 115) Self-blindness is supposed to be analogous to color-
blindness. Just as a person who is color-blind can learn information about color in a non-
standard way, through reading a book about colors for instance, a person who is self-blind 
can learn about her own beliefs, desires, and intentions in a non-standard way, which is to 
say a completely third-personal way. Instead of having first-person access to her 
psychological states, the self-blind person will have to make observations of her behavior in 
order to know what she believes, wants, or intends.  Moreover, self-blindness is ‘supposed to 
be perceptual or quasi-perceptual, rather than cognitive or conceptual.’ (1988, pg. 118)  For 
this reason, self-blindness is a condition of subjects who are at least as rational and 
conceptually sophisticated as any ordinary person.  
 Shoemaker actually tailors his self-blindness argument to different types of 
psychological states, but each variation rests on a version of a thought experiment that asks 
us to try to imagine a self-blind person with respect to a specific type of state.8 In what 
follows, I will focus primarily on beliefs but Shoemaker's arguments are similar for other 
attitudes. My use of the term 'psychological attitude' or 'attitude' is meant to apply only to 
attitudes that are sensitive to a subject's judgments, paradigmatically beliefs, desires, and 
                                                 
8 The different versions can all be found in Shoemaker (1994). 
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intentions (cf. Scanlon, 1998; Hieronymi, 2005). These are the focus of Shoemaker's 
arguments and are also at the center of several recent discussions of self-knowledge (e.g., 
Bilgrami, 2006; Boyle, 2009, 2011; Fernandez, 2013; Gertler, forthcoming; Moran 2001, 
2012; [Author Suppressed]). So if there are any attitudes that are insensitive to judgment, 
perhaps for instance implicit attitudes or what Gendler (2008) calls aliefs, these will fall 
outside the scope of this essay.   
When he discusses belief, Shoemaker asks us to try to imagine a self-blind person 
that he names George. Shoemaker's first argument involves Moore's paradox.  He suggests 
that, if George were self-blind, we should be able to imagine that ‘the total evidence available 
to a man at a given time should support the proposition that it is raining, while the total 
“third-person” evidence available to him should support the proposition that he does not 
believe that it is raining.’ (1988, pg. 118) In this case, it would seem reasonable for George to 
assert a Moore-paradoxical proposition like ‘It is raining, but I do not believe that it is 
raining’. But, Shoemaker points out that any rational person can recognize a Moore-
paradoxical assertion is inappropriate. Since we are supposing George to be fully rational, he 
will avoid asserting a Moore-paradoxical proposition. Hence he would not attribute beliefs to 
himself in a manner that noticeably diverged from the way any of us would.   
 Shoemaker also presents what seems to be a second argument.  He thinks that, 
because George has mastery of the concept of belief, the following two things will be true: 
A) He will recognize that when asked "'Do you believe that P?' he ought to answer 'yes' just 
in case he would answer 'yes' to the question "Is it true that P?" 
B) He will recognize the meaning of "believe" and preface his assertions with "I believe" in 
just the circumstances in which this is pragmatically appropriate.  
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Plausibly, A) follows from George's being a rational believer with the concept of belief.    
When asked whether or not you believe that P, like George, you usually consider the truth of 
P.9 The concept of belief is that of an attitude responsive to the truth it represents and 
understanding this connection between belief and truth is a large part of having that concept.  
 Having the concept of belief also means George can appreciate the relevance of 
pragmatic considerations for self-ascribing belief. For example, when I lose my keys, I have 
to look for them. Where are they? I don't really know and there is no clear evidence 
indicating their location. But, I have a hunch they are in my office. In this sort of case, my 
saying ‘I believe the keys are in my office’ is a way of making a hesitant assertion about the 
location of my keys. Since George has conceptual mastery, he could behave the same way I 
do when I lose my keys. Like me, he could say ‘I believe that the keys are in my office’ in 
appropriate contexts.  
 On the basis of these arguments, Shoemaker concludes that George would self-
ascribe beliefs in the exact same conditions any of us would. There would therefore ‘be 
nothing in his behavior, verbal or otherwise, that would give away the fact that he lacks self-
acquaintance.’ When we try to imagine George, we can only imagine a person who reports 
beliefs just as we would, which means that we cannot really imagine a distinctively self-blind 
person. This, Shoemaker insists, just means that self-blindness is not a genuine possibility. If 
it were, ‘there should be something that would show, or at any rate provide good evidence, 
that someone was afflicted with such self-blindness.’(1994, pg. 233)  
One might worry that Shoemaker’s argument is committed to some kind of 
behaviourism. But the claim he is making is not that George must have some type of first-
                                                 
9 This familiar point is found in discussions of self-knowledge that focus on its so-called ‘transparency’ (e.g., 
Boyle (2011); Byrne (2005), (2011); Fernandez (2013); Moran (2001), (2012)). 
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person access because his observable behaviour indicates that he does.  It may be that there 
are conditions in which it is in George’s best interest to deceive others about what he 
believes, or cases where he simply doesn’t care whether others know what he believes.  
Shoemaker’s point is that, simply by virtue of being rational, George will be able to reason 
from his awareness of what he takes to be true, to various types of action that are rationally 
appropriate given what he takes to be true and, crucially, in a wide range of contexts this will 
include him self-ascribing beliefs.  In Shoemaker’s words, ‘he acts as if he believes that p, 
when he does so believe, which seems contrary to the supposition that he is self-blind with 
respect to his beliefs.’10 (2009, pg. 37)    
 It is important to keep in mind that George is supposed to be completely unable to 
become aware of his beliefs except in a third-personal way.  Even if we can conceive of 
someone lacking first-person access to some of her beliefs this is not self-blindness. We all 
lack that kind of access to some of our beliefs some of the time, but none of us are self-
blind. To conceive of a self-blind person, we would need to imagine a person who is as 
sophisticated as we are psychologically, rationally, and conceptually without any first-person 
access at all. Is this possible? I tend to agree with Shoemaker that it is not.11 It is certainly 
difficult for me to imagine such a person. However, regardless of whether one could make a 
case for it, for the remainder of this essay, I shall stipulate that self-blindness is impossible in 
order to see what this means for the Distinct Existence Thesis. 
 
2. The Argument from Self-Blindness  
                                                 
10 For Shoemaker’s own defense against the charge of behaviourism, see section 2 of his (2009).   
11 Others disagree. See, for instance, Kind (2003) and Finkelstein (1999). 
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Shoemaker presents the self-blindness argument against a model of self-knowledge that he 
labels the ‘broad perceptual model’, which encompasses any theory of self-knowledge that is 
committed to the following two conditions: 
The ‘causal condition’ that ‘our beliefs about our mental states are caused by those  
mental states’ and 
The ‘independence condition’ that ‘the existence of these states and events is  
independent of their being known in this way, and even of there existing the  
mechanisms that make such knowledge possible.’ (1994, pg. 271)   
 
According to Shoemaker, if the broad perceptual model were true, then self-blindness would 
be possible. Yet, although this model is characterized by Shoemaker in terms of these two 
conditions, it is really just the ‘independence condition’ that figures in his argument.  
According to Shoemaker, the ‘logical’ possibility of self-blindness is a ‘consequence of the 
independence condition’. (1994, pg. 273; cp. 1988))  Thus, even though what he calls the 
causal condition plausibly entails the independence condition, it is worth keeping in mind 
that refuting Shoemaker’s self-blindness argument would not demonstrate the causal 
condition is correct.  It would not demonstrate that a subject’s psychological state M stands 
in some kind of causal relation to her higher-order belief that she is in M.  Rather, it would 
only show that we do not yet have an argument for thinking that the two stand in a 
necessary relation.12   
                                                 
12 One view that therefore remains open is that a’s mental state M is a proper part or partially constitutes her 
higher-order belief that she is in M (so long as the constitution relation here is not construed as identity).  This 
would allow for the two entities to be construed as distinct in the sense required by Shoemaker’s independence 
condition: M could exist independently from a’s higher-order belief that a is in M (and vice versa).  This is the 
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 Does Shoemaker's self-blindness argument refute the Distinct Existence Thesis?  
Shoemaker does not explicitly address the Distinct Existence Thesis as I have formulated it. 
Nonetheless, the Distinct Existence Thesis, plausibly entails at least the independence condition 
that he attributes to the broad perceptual model.  This is because , as we have seen, it 
commits one to thinking that one’s being in a psychological state M and one’s true belief that 
one is in M are wholly distinct and therefore independent in the relevant sense. It follows 
that if the Distinct Existence Thesis were true, self-blindness would be possible.13     
The self-blindness argument can be rendered in the form of modus tollens: 
(1) If the Distinct Existence Thesis is true, then self-blindness is possible. 
(2) Self-blindness is not possible. 
Thus, the Distinct Existence Thesis is not true.   
                                                                                                                                                 
sort of contingent parthood relation that holds between my left thumb and me or between me and my family. 
It has no modal implications (even it always holds in normal conditions). As far as I am aware, no one holds 
this sort of view, but one might naturally call it a ‘constitutive’ theory. It is nevertheless quite different from the 
constitutive theories prevalent in philosophy which are clearly presented as having modal implications.  Since I 
lack space to discuss this type of view in this essay, I shall briefly mention just one potential problem before 
setting it aside.   
Many philosophers will want to hold at least some sort of weak supplementation principle on 
parthood relations. But I don’t think it is clear what the other non-overlapping proper parts of a’s higher-order 
belief that a is in M could be (for some very intuitive considerations in support of weak supplementation see 
Sider, 2007).  For instance, Shoemaker mentions things like rationality, intelligence, and conceptual capacities, 
but it seems to me these might potentially violate a standard anti-symmetry principle governing parthood – for 
instance, it is plausible that truly believing that one is in M is part of being rational.    
13It is also worth keeping in mind that Shoemaker’s self-blindness argument does not demonstrate that his is 
preferred constitutive theory is true, only that we need to reject theories of self-knowledge committed to the 
independence condition. 
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Since we have already granted (2), this argument can be resisted only if premise (1) is wrong. 
Thus we must inquire as to whether the Distinct Existence Thesis really does entail the 
possibility of self-blindness.   
Shoemaker’s argument for (1) proceeds primarily by analogy. Specifically, he appeals 
to perceptual knowledge to illustrate what it is for an entity to be independent from our way 
of knowing about it. It is clearly possible that material objects could exist without us and 
without any of our modes of perceptual access to them. This, Shoemaker claims, is a 
consequence of their being ‘logically independent’ from our ways of knowing about them:  
‘The objects and states of affairs which the perception is of, and which it provides 
knowledge about, exist independently of the perceiving of them, and with certain exceptions, 
independently of there being things with the capacity for perceiving them or being aware of 
them. Thus trees, mountains, etc. can exist without there being creatures with the capacity to 
perceive them, and it is in principle possible for houses, automobiles and human bodies to 
exist in this way.’ [N.B. the exception is perceiving other perceivers] (1994; pg. 254) 
 
Just like trees and mountains could exist in a world without creatures capable of perceiving 
them, Shoemaker thinks that if beliefs were wholly distinct from our standard way of 
knowing about them, it would be possible for them to exist in creatures that lacked the 
capacity to access to them in a first-personal way. Thus, according to Shoemaker’s argument, 
(1) is true because the Distinct Existence Thesis entails ‘that for each kind of mental fact to 
which we have introspective access, it is at least logically possible that there should be 
creatures in which such facts obtain, and who have the ability to conceive of them, but who 
are self-blind with respect to them.’ (1994; pg. 273)  
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 This line of reasoning for (1) can be resisted. It is not true for any entities,  and , 
that if they are independent from each other, then there is a possible world in which  exists 
and  does not. If, for example,  were a necessary existent, then there would be no possible 
-world that is not also a -world, but not because the existence of  somehow depends on 
the existence of .14 Along similar lines, if two properties F and G are independent from 
each other, this means that some possible individual can exemplify F without G (and vice 
versa).  Yet, it might nevertheless be impossible that every individual can exemplify F without 
exemplifying G (¬<>Vx(Fx ->¬Gx), most clearly in cases where G is an essential property 
of the individual in question. Thus, there may be a certain individual or even a specific kind 
of individual that cannot exemplify F without exemplifying G, because one or the other is 
essential to that kind.   
This is why Shoemaker's analogy with material objects is misleading. We tend to have 
the intuition that trees and mountains are substances, which suggests that not only are they 
independent from our capacities to perceive them, but from everything else as well. It is 
therefore quite easy to envision a world with trees and mountains but no ‘creatures with the 
capacity to perceive them.’  By contrast, psychological attitudes are not substances; they are 
properties of psychological subjects, some of which, like us, are rational subjects.  
The previous section's reflections on self-blindness concern modality not 
independence. If they are correct, they show that there is no possible world in which a 
rational subject lacks the capacity to access her beliefs in a distinctively first-personal way. 
But, to determine whether or not (1) is true, the relevant question is not whether this is the 
case, but why it is the case? One way to explain this necessity is by appealing to the nature of 
                                                 
14 For other examples and for discussion of the relation between modality and dependence, see Fine (1995).  
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the underlying attitudes. Shoemaker typically writes as if he prefers this kind of explanation.  
For instance, he claims that a rational subject cannot be self-blind because it is ‘the essence 
of many kinds of mental states to reveal themselves to introspection’ (1994; 287) He also 
claims that denying the possibility of self-blindness amounts to holding a view about ‘the 
nature of certain mental states.’ (1988, pg. 31)  However, rather than appealing to the nature 
of certain psychological attitudes, it might be that the capacity for first-person access is 
grounded instead in the nature of our rationality. That is, it may be that the nature of rational 
subjects, rather than the nature or essence any psychological attitudes, is what explains why 
self-blindness is not possible.   
To be fair, Shoemaker sometimes writes as if he has this last idea in mind. For 
instance, in one of his earlier papers, he says ‘it is of the essence of mind that each mind has 
a special access to its own contents, or more soberly expressed, that each person has a 
special access to his own mental states.’ (1988, pg. 115) He also makes several remarks about 
how what is ‘essential to a rational being’ involves being ‘sensitive to the contents of one's 
belief-desire system in such a way as to enable its contents to be revised and updated in the 
light of new experience, and enable inconsistencies and incoherences in its content to be 
eliminated.’ (1994, pg. 285; see also 1990)  In the following section, I shall draw on precisely 
this sort of idea to argue that the nature of rationality can fully explain the impossibility of 
self-blindness. I take my argument to be congenial to most of what Shoemaker says about 
rational agents and rationality. But, as I shall argue, if the impossibility of self-blindness can 
be fully explained in this manner, we do not have to accept (1). We are not committed to the 
premiss that the Distinct Existence Thesis entails the possibility of self-blindness, if some other 
feature of rational subjectivity rules it out.    
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3. Rational Self-Awareness 
Several philosophers writing on self-knowledge have recently stressed that a rational 
subject's judgment-sensitive attitudes like belief, desire, and intention are normally 
responsive to reasons (e.g., Bilgrami, 2006; Boyle, 2012; Moran, 2001, 2012; [Author 
Suppressed]). For example, Richard Moran writes that ‘I take what I believe to be answerable 
to my sense of reasons and justification, and I take myself to be responsible for making my 
belief conform to my sense of the reasons in favor or against.’ (2003, pg. 405) It should be 
fairly uncontroversial that, as a rational agent, one’s beliefs are usually sensitive to evidence 
and to justifying reasons that bear on the truths they represent. If I believe that P and am 
confronted with what I take to be a conclusive reason that P is false, I will, insofar as I am 
rational, immediately stop believing P.  In this way, my assessment of the world, my take on 
reasons for or against the truth of P, makes an immediate and substantial difference to the 
existence and character of my belief. My appreciation of reasons for or against those beliefs 
directly affects them and has the potential to change them. In this section, I would like to 
suggest that this explains why a rational subject with the ability to consciously self-ascribe 
beliefs must have a capacity for first-person access to them.  
Tyler Burge has stressed that having this mode of epistemic access is necessary for an 
individual to engage in what he calls ‘critical reflection’ upon her beliefs.15 Burge argues that ‘it 
is constitutive of critical reasoning that if the reasons or assumptions being reviewed are 
justifiably found wanting by the reviewer, it rationally follows immediately that there is prima 
facie reason for changing or supplementing them, where this reason applies within the point 
of view of the reviewed material (not just within the reviewing perspective).’ (1996, pg. 109; 
cf. Gertler, forthcoming) Someone reasoning critically in Burge's sense must focus her 
                                                 
15 Shoemaker gives a similar argument in his 1990, 1994, and 2009. 
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attention on her beliefs so that she can rationally evaluate them. This will sometimes 
culminate in a judgment to the effect that a particular belief is warranted or not by reasons, a 
judgment that Burge notes necessarily has the potential to immediately change the original 
state. Burge thinks that if our way of knowing about our own beliefs always rested on some 
kind of behavioral evidence, ‘there would never be an immediate rationally necessary 
connection’ between what we deliberatively judge we ought to believe and what we in fact 
believe. Why not?   
 In order for someone to engage in critical reflection, it is clear that she must be 
aware of her beliefs. Suppose she is indirectly aware of them in a more third-personal 
manner. When someone takes up this sort of perspective, she treats her own beliefs similarly 
to the way she does those of others, which is to say that she treats them like facts that are 
not necessarily determined by her assessment of what is most reasonable to believe (cf. 
Moran, 2012). This is because, from a third-person point of view, a person’s best judgments 
about what her beliefs ought to be does not settle what they in fact are, and this is why critical 
judgments made from a third-personal standpoint lack an ‘immediate rationally necessary 
connection’ to the subject’s beliefs. They are judgments made from a perspective that treats 
one’s beliefs as things that might not be determined by one's rational judgments.   
 In fact, for this reason, it seems to me that Burge overemphasizes the importance of 
critical reflection.16 It rather seems to me that a rational subject who has the ability to 
consciously self-ascribing beliefs requires first-person access to them, whether or not she 
                                                 
16 Cf. Moran (2012). In contrast to Burge, Moran claims that 'the non-observational character of self-
knowledge with respect to actions and attitudes is tied to their being expressions of the rational, active side of 
one’s nature.' (2012, pg. 220; cf. 2001) He goes on to explicate this in terms of what he calls the 'transparency 
condition'. For further discussion, see [Author suppressed]. 
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ever subjects them to deliberative or critical evaluation. This is because from a rational 
subject's point of view, one’s beliefs depend on her having adequate reasons for them.17 This 
is fundamental to the nature of the first-person perspective of a rational believer. So, from 
that perspective, if I take myself to believe that P--which I definitely do if I consciously 
attribute the belief to myself--it is only because I take there to be some good reason or set of 
reasons in favor of the truth of P.  Note that this does not mean that my belief that P must 
be the result of any conscious, deliberative, or reflective process; as Burge rightly notes, 
'much of our reasoning is blind, poorly accessible, and unaware.' (1996, p. 99; cf. Kornblith, 
2012) Nevertheless, as a rational subject, when I attribute a belief to myself, I am attributing 
an attitude that I at least tacitly conceptualize as being appropriately grounded in reasons for 
believing, even in cases where I cannot articulate what those reasons are.    
 Some philosophers think this conception of rational belief is too demanding. For 
instance, Quassim Cassam claims that ‘much of the time, our reasoning isn’t guided by an 
appreciation, use, and assessment of reasons and reasoning as such. We are reluctant to 
criticize our reasons, and we do not guard against possible sources of bias.’ (2014, pg. 17) So 
it is worth emphasizing that the bare idea that a rational subject takes her beliefs to depend 
on adequate reasons is fairly minimal. Insofar as I am rational, when I self-ascribe the belief 
                                                 
17 What about groundless convictions, like my belief that the Cubs will win the World Series? These are surely 
not formed deliberatively on the basis of reasons or evidence.  Even so, for a rational subject, we might think 
that these sorts of convictions depend on her having adequate reasons in the sense that once she becomes 
aware of compelling evidence that the belief is false (e.g., the Cubs fail to make the playoffs), she will stop 
believe that the Cubs will win the series.  It is worth noting, that we might also think such a subject does not 
have the same kind of epistemic access to her groundless convictions. For example, it seems less likely that she 
could know that she believes that the Cubs will win the series on the basis of what Moran (2001) calls the 
‘transparency method’. For further discussion of groundless convictions, see Martin (1998).  
Self-Blindness and Self-Knowledge 
 20 
that P, I do not need to grasp precisely which considerations are my reasons or basis for 
believing that P (I may have forgotten them), nor do I have to have formed the belief on the 
basis of conscious deliberation about some set of reasons or evidence (I don’t often do this). 
Rather, as a rational believer, I am simply committed to there being some sufficient reason(s) 
in favor of believing that P and this is because my rational beliefs must be sensitive to any 
judgments about reasons that I would make.18 So, for instance, if I were to judge that there 
were absolutely no good reasons to believe that P (perhaps I have just learned that Jones is 
not really trustworthy), then, insofar as I am rational, I will immediately stop believing that P 
(cf. [Author Suppressed]). As Burge suggests, there must be a rationally immediate connection 
between this sort of judgment about reasons and what I actually believe. My point is that this 
connection must hold in cases other than those where a subject critically reflects upon her 
beliefs. 
If a rational subject’s ability to self-ascribe beliefs involves conceiving of them as 
attitudes that depend exclusively on reasons, then this plausibly requires one to have a mode 
of epistemic access to them that is not based on behavioral evidence. If my way of self-
attributing beliefs rested entirely on third-personal ways of knowing, then it would mean that 
from my own perspective my belief that P might not depend on what I regard as adequate 
reasons for holding it. This is because behavioral evidence in favor of the proposition that I 
believe that that P is typically not evidence for the truth of the proposition P. So if I base my 
                                                 
18 Cassam (2014) emphasizes several ways in which human beings are sometimes less than rational, for instance 
by having recalcitrant beliefs which persevere in the face of counterevidence (cf. Bortolotti, 2010).  These are 
interesting cases, but are beyond the scope of this essay. Again, the question is whether, insofar as one is a 
rational agent, one must have a capacity for first-person access. If so, this is compatible with one lacking first-
person access to a range of attitudes.    
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attribution on such evidence, on something other than a reason in favor of P, it amounts to 
admitting that my belief might not depend exclusively on reasons for believing P. In that 
case, my act of self-attribution would leave open the possibility that there are no good 
reasons for believing that P.   
An example may help make this point clearer. Suppose that I come to know that I 
believe that my neighborhood is unsafe on the basis of behavioral evidence. I recognize, for 
instance, that I check the locks on my windows and doors much more frequently than in any 
other place I have lived. I also notice that I walk extremely quickly through my 
neighborhood and regularly glance over my shoulder. This kind of behavior is very good 
evidence that I believe my neighborhood is unsafe and so good evidence for attributing this 
belief to myself.  But it is not good evidence that the neighborhood is actually unsafe. 
Indeed, the behavioral evidence for what I believe is consistent with there being no reasons 
at all to think my neighborhood is unsafe. By self-attributing a belief in this way, I leave open 
the possibility that what I believe is not determined by what I think I ought to believe. My 
point is that when a person relates to her own beliefs in a first-personal way, she must take 
this possibility to be closed off. From that perspective, she must take herself to believe that 
her neighborhood is unsafe only because that belief is adequately supported by reasons and 
that requires her to have a capacity for epistemic access to her beliefs in a way that is not 
based on publically available behavioral evidence.19  
But couldn’t I have reasons, perhaps even excellent ones, for thinking that the beliefs 
I ascribe from a third-person perspective are in fact based on good reasons?  For instance, 
especially since I don’t remember the basis for much of what I believe, I might reasonably 
                                                 
19 Moran (2001), I think, is getting at a similar thought when he describes first-personal self-knowledge as a 
'rational requirement'.  
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take myself to have a general reason for thinking that all my beliefs are based on good 
reasons. So, if I were to self-ascribe the belief that P from a third-person perspective, I 
would also take that belief to be appropriately grounded in reasons for believing P.  It seems 
unlikely that the first-person method of self-ascription would give me any better reasons for 
thinking that my belief is well-grounded. 
The point, however, is not about whether one has epistemic reasons for thinking that 
one’s beliefs are actually based on good reasons. It may be true that I have reasons for 
thinking that everything I believe is based on some good reasons for believing.  The point, 
however, is about the necessary ‘rational immediacy’ of the connection between a rational 
subject’s judgments about reasons for believing and the things she actually does believe. It is 
internal to the first-person perspective of a rational agent that the beliefs one self-ascribes 
are immediately sensitive to the judgments one makes. 
  By contrast, self-ascribing the belief that P on the basis of behavioural evidence 
leaves open the possibility that what I believe diverges from my rational assessment of 
reasons right now, at the moment of self-ascription.  So, a third-personal mode of self-
ascription leaves open the possibility that, if I were to reconsider the question of whether P, 
I might come to a conclusion that diverges from what I actually believe. That is a possibility 
that must be closed off in order, as Burge says, for rational judgments or evaluations to 
necessarily have an immediate consequence on what I believe.  The difference between the 
third-person and the first-person is therefore not one of acquiring better epistemic reasons 
for taking one’s beliefs to be based on reasons or evidence. It is rather that only from the 
first-person perspective do one’s rational judgments immediately affect what one believes.   
In response, someone might object that just as considering one's total evidence is the 
most rational way to form beliefs about one’s neighborhood, it is also the most rational way 
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to form beliefs about one’s beliefs. Indeed, it could even be argued that if a person is 
attempting to learn about what she already believes as opposed to what she ought to believe, 
she should consider every bit of available evidence so as not to accidentally change what she 
believes (Shah and Velleman, 2005). I think there are cases where it is epistemically 
responsible to base one's self-ascriptions on behavioral evidence. Prior to noticing my 
nervous habits, I was not aware of my belief that my neighborhood is unsafe. Nevertheless, 
that belief played a pretty important role in my life. It may be that the only way I could ever 
have learned about it was by noticing my nervous reactions. If so, it seems responsible to 
acquire knowledge of this belief on that basis. However, it is important to realize that this 
point does not generalize. It is not that a rational agent cannot sometimes self-ascribe beliefs 
in a third-personal way. But she can only do so by distancing herself or disengaging from the 
more fundamental first-person standpoint of a rational agent (cf. Moran, 2012). If she always 
acquired knowledge of her beliefs in a third-personal way, they would remain at too far a 
distance from her sense of reasons for holding them. 
The proposal sketched in this section is one way of explicating the idea that the 
impossibility of self-blindness can be accounted by the nature of rationality. But absolutely 
nothing about it implies that a subject's psychological states must be related in a way that is 
incompatible with the Distinct Existence Thesis. If rational subjectivity requires first-person 
access to one’s attitudes, then we do not have a reason for denying that those attitudes are 
wholly distinct existences. 
 
4. Dependence 
The previous explanation of the necessity of first-person access rests on the claim that a 
rational subject's beliefs depend on her sense of reasons for them. It is important to clarify 
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this. A number of philosophers employ the phrase ‘sense of reasons’ but in doing so they 
can mean very different things.20 One might mean to refer to a subject's actual judgments, 
either implicit or explicit, about reasons for or against her beliefs or, alternatively, one might 
instead mean to refer to a subject's dispositions to judge. I prefer the second interpretation. 
Notice, however, that even if we were to adopt the former, the claim that a subject's beliefs 
depend on her actual judgments about reasons for believing is not obviously a claim with 
any modal implications. If an agent explicitly and consciously judges that there are 
conclusive reasons against the truth of P, her belief that P might cease to exist, but it might 
also persist despite her well-considered judgment (cf. Cassam, 2014, chapter 2). This sort of 
thing should be familiar and it shows, I think, that a rational subject's beliefs can persist 
independently of her actual judgments about reasons.21 
On my preferred interpretation, the central claim of the previous section is that a 
rational subject's belief that P depends on her being disposed to judge in the right 
circumstances that certain reasons adequately support the truth of P. Although this is 
consistent with the Distinct Existence Thesis as formulated, one might worry that it goes against 
the spirit of the thesis. More specifically, one might take the proposal in the previous section 
to be making a claim about a different sort of necessary constitutive relation.    
                                                 
20 This language is prominent in Moran (2001; 2012). However, it is not clear to me which of the 
interpretations presented in this section, if either, Moran would favor.  . 
21 Indeed, there is some reason to think they could not. If judgments are mental events, then, as Helen Steward 
(1997) has argued, they do not seem to have the right ontological profile either to be identical with or to 
compose persisting psychological attitudes (cf. Soteriou, 2013). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that even if one 
were inclined for some reason to think a subject's beliefs did depend on her actual judgments, this would still 
be very different from the sort of relation we have been considering in this essay insofar as it would be 
compatible with the subject's beliefs being wholly distinct from her higher-order beliefs about them. 
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To see this, we can express the proposal from the previous section using the ‘part of 
what it is to be’ operator:   
 
BELIEF RATIONALITY 1: Part of what it is for a to believe that P is for a to be disposed 
to make the appropriate judgments about reasons.   
 
Indeed, since beliefs are frequently thought to be dispositions or sets of dispositions, it is 
quite easy to see how they might be either identical to, or partially constituted by a subject's 
dispositions to judge certain kinds of things (cf. Schwitzgebel, 2002).22 If we interpret the 
previous section’s proposal along these lines, Belief Rationality 1 would also have modal 
implications; for instance, necessarily (if a believes that P, then a is disposed to judge (in the 
right circumstances) that P is true).   
I don’t think it is obviously wrong to think that part of what it is for a rational 
subject to believe that P something is for her to have dispositions to judge certain things. 
Nevertheless, I think this is not quite the best way to understand the relation between the 
two. The issue comes down to whether or not we are inclined to think that a rational subject 
can believe that P without having the appropriate dispositions. For instance, could a rational 
agent believe that P and be disposed to judge that evidence conclusively shows P is true but 
then, for various reasons, lose this disposition while nevertheless retaining the belief? If this 
                                                 
22 One might also think that beliefs are constitutively related to other beliefs such that, for instance, part of 
what it is for a to believe that P is for a to believe that Q.  It seems to me that the reasons given in this section 
against Belief Rationality 1 would also be reasons to avoid this sort of view in favour of one analogous to Belief 
Rationality 2.   
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sort of thing can happen, then it does not seem quite right to think that part of what it is for a 
to believe that P is for a to be disposed to judge that the evidence shows P is true.   
One might object that this indicates some kind of irrationality on the part of the 
subject. That is, someone who forms a belief on the basis of a deliberative judgment that P is 
true, but then retains it despite losing her disposition to judge that P is true might seem 
irrational. Since a is by hypothesis a rational agent, it would not matter whether an irrational 
believer could continue to believe something without retaining the sorts of dispositions one 
finds in rational agents. Yet, it does not seem to me that losing the disposition to judge that 
P is true, or adequately supported by evidence, automatically impugns the rationality of a 
believer. Indeed, in paradigmatic cases of rational belief revision, there will be an interval 
where a subject both believes that P and lacks dispositions to judge that P is true, or likely to 
be true, or adequately supported by evidence. It seems to me that sometimes that interval 
can be quite significant.   
Let's return to the belief that my neighborhood is unsafe. Suppose now that I believe 
this not out of fear or paranoia but because it is actually not safe. Imagine that the rate of 
violent crime is unusually high, that burglaries are common, and that most of the 
neighborhood residents are armed. In such a scenario, it is reasonable to think I would both 
be disposed to judge and rationally believe that my neighborhood is not safe. Let's suppose 
this is true. But now imagine that over a number of years my neighborhood is the target of 
major government intervention. Police presence increases and there is an influx of private 
investment. Both unemployment and criminal activity decline and, over time, the 
neighborhood slowly becomes safe. Noticing these gradual changes, I get to the point where 
I am no longer disposed to judge that my neighborhood is unsafe. For example, if someone 
were to ask me whether it was, I would say ‘no’. Despite my acknowledgment of the 
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newfound safety of the neighborhood, it seems possible that I continue to believe that the 
neighborhood is unsafe. This might involve me manifesting behavior such as glancing 
nervously over my shoulder or installing extra locks on my house. We know that an 
individual can have beliefs like this, beliefs that are discordant with what they are disposed to 
judge (cf. Peacocke, 1998; Cassam, 2014).  It seems to me that we also know beliefs of this 
sort can persist for a fair amount of time. Indeed, as Cassam notes, ‘the more long-standing 
and deeply embedded your belief that P the harder you may find to shake it off when 
confronted by evidence which you realize undermines it.’ (2014, pg. 23) This suggests that 
one's belief can persist even after one's dispositions have changed.23  
                                                 
23 Someone might argue that even in cases like my neighborhood example a subject does not really lose the 
dispositions to judge that P is true or supported by good reasons. It is just that the dispositions are masked in 
some way. One might therefore argue that even after the neighborhood becomes safe, I retain the disposition 
to judge it is unsafe; it is just that that disposition is inhibited. Although this alternative way of describing the 
case is available, I think there are at least two reasons to resist it. First, we might think an individual simply 
cannot have directly opposing dispositions. For example, a person cannot simultaneously be disposed to blink 
and be disposed to not blink in the same circumstances. (cf. Handfield and Bird, 2008). Secondly, with respect 
to an ability to act in a certain way, one might be disposed to exercise the ability in a specific manner or toward 
a particular end (e.g., one might be disposed to run slowly, or for ten miles); however, in such cases, we tend to 
think that the individual's disposition can only be masked by something external to the agent, not by one of the 
agent's intrinsic properties. We can perhaps imagine a case in which someone is disposed to judge that P but 
bizarre events bring about the opposite judgment (this is the sort of thing that happens in Frankfurt-style 
cases). Yet, if nothing extrinsic to the agent causes her to judge that P, if that is her successful intentional 
action, it is hard to see how the person could also have some masked disposition to judge that not P. Similarly, 
if a person deliberates on the safety of the neighborhood and judges it to be safe, there is something odd about 
thinking they have somehow failed to exercise the disposition to judge it unsafe.  
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If, as a rational agent, I am able to retain the belief that my neighborhood is unsafe 
even when I am no longer disposed to judge that it is, then it is less plausible to think that 
the belief depends on my dispositions to judge. Of course, once I lose the appropriate 
dispositions, my belief becomes evidently irrational by my own lights, which means it 
changes in an extremely significant respect. But it notably does not cease to exist. This 
suggests that it is the rationality of my belief, rather than its existence, that depends on my 
dispositions to make the appropriate judgments. I therefore propose that we understand the 
idea that a rational subject's beliefs depend on her sense of reasons as claiming that one’s 
beliefs are rational in virtue of one's dispositions to make the appropriate judgments about 
reasons. 24  
We could still use the ‘part of what it is to be’ operator to express this sort of 
dependence:    
 
BELIEF RATIONALITY 2: Part of what it is for a to rationally believe that P is for a to 
be disposed to make the appropriate judgments about reasons. 
 
Like its ancestor, this too will have modal implications.  For instance, necessarily (if a 
rationally believes that P, then a is disposed to judge (in the right circumstances) that P is 
true).  The crucial difference between this formulation and Belief Rationality 1 is that 
‘rationality’ now serves to modify a’s belief that P. This reflects the fact that it is the rationality 
of one’s belief that depends on one having the right dispositions to judge that P is true, or 
likely to be true, or supported by evidence.  If one loses those dispositions, then one’s belief 
                                                 
24 Some people (but only some) use the term 'grounding' for the type of relation I have in mind. For further 
discussion, see Audi (2012) and Rosen (2010).  
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may persist, and but it would be irrational. However, an instance of an irrational belief does 
not indicate that the subject of belief somehow fails to be a rational agent. Rational agents 
sometimes believe irrational things – indeed they sometimes consciously believe irrational 
things. Our rationality is far from perfect.  
My thinking about dependence in this manner is motivated, in part, by the thought 
that rationality does not demarcate a natural psychological kind.25 So, although my rationally 
believing that P and my rationally desiring that P are ways in which I exemplify a 
psychological  property (i.e., desire or belief), rational belief and rational desire are not 
themselves psychological kinds. If this is right, it means that a subject's way of relating to her 
attitudes determines whether or not they are rational, not the underlying natures or essences 
of those attitudes.26 It would therefore be wrong to conclude from the fact that a rational 
agent must have certain kinds of dispositions that this is because the existence of certain 
                                                 
25 This may mean that my conception of rational psychological attitudes is committed to what Boyle calls an 
‘additive theory’ of rationality (2016). Boyle raises two objections to additive theories of certain rational 
capacities, which I think could be extended to the sort of view I’m sketching in this essay. But I lack space to 
address them in this essay.     
26 But what if a subject’s judgments are themselves irrational?  Wouldn’t making an irrational judgment about 
reasons determine that a subject’s beliefs are also irrational?  I think it depends. A subject’s belief can be 
epistemically irrational if it is formed on the basis of an epistemically irrational judgment, which is not 
correctable because, for example, we cannot get the subject to properly evaluate the available evidence (there is 
a question as to when this sort of recalcitrance becomes delusional, cf. Bortolotti (2010)).  This kind of 
irrationality of one’s belief is derived from the epistemic irrationality of one’s judgment.  Part of what the 
discussion in this essay brings out is that there is a different kind of irrationality implicated in cases where one’s 
beliefs come apart from what one is disposed to judge. This sense of irrationality might best be characterized in 
terms of a kind of dissociation, or alienation, but it is clearly possible even in cases where a subject’s judgments 
about reasons for belief are epistemically flawless. 
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kinds of attitudes in her psychological life are, by their very nature, necessarily connected to 
those dispositions.  
We are now in a position to see a second respect in which first-person access is 
epistemically distinctive when compared to the kind of epistemic access we have toward the 
psychological attitudes of others (the first, which we have already seen, is that it is not based 
on behavioral evidence). It is plausible that if someone has a capacity for first-person access, 
which is an epistemic capacity, she will thereby be disposed to form higher-order beliefs 
about her own psychological attitudes. Why is that? Generally, it seems that whenever a 
capacity does not require exercising volition, having the capacity to Ф entails being disposed 
to Ф.27 Moreover, since exercising one’s epistemic capacity for first-person access would 
involve forming a higher-order belief about one’s attitudes, it means that anyone with a 
capacity for first-person access would have a disposition to form higher-order beliefs about 
her psychological attitudes.  However, I have argued that it is necessary that a rational subject 
has first-person access to her psychological attitudes, which suggests the following line of 
argument: 
 
(3) Necessarily, for any rational subject a and psychological attitude M, if M(a), then  
a has a capacity for first-person access to M(a). 
                                                 
27 This assumption that first-person access is a non-voluntary epistemic capacity is one reason to think that 
what Shoemaker calls ‘first-person agnosticism’ (1990) is impossible.   
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(4) Necessarily, for any rational subject a and psychological attitude M, if M(a) and a 
has the capacity for first-person access to M(a), then a is disposed to believe 
(first-personally) that M(a).28  
First-Personal Dispositions:  Necessarily, for any rational subject a and psychological 
attitude M, (if M(a), then a is disposed to believe (first-personally) that M(a)).29 
 
Earlier I conceded to Shoemaker that it is impossible for a rational subject to lack the 
capacity for first-person access, but it now seems that this would mean it is impossible for a 
rational subject to lack a disposition to form true higher-order beliefs about her judgment-
sensitive attitudes. Because the first-person mode of epistemic access is something that a 
rational subject must have toward her attitudes and because it implies the existence of this 
disposition, it looks clearly different from the types of epistemic access we have to the 
attitudes of other subjects. The epistemic capacities that allow me to access your 
psychological attitudes and form beliefs about them do not involve me having any 
disposition to form true beliefs about the attitudes you have, certainly not as a matter of 
necessity. Therefore, since the view I sketched in the previous section implies First-Personal 
Dispositions, it can be thought to validate the intuition that first-person access to one’s own 
mental states is distinctive - it is a necessary epistemic capacity for rational subjects that 
brings with it a disposition to form true beliefs about a subset of psychological attitudes, 
                                                 
28 There will naturally be instances in which this disposition is masked. I am grateful to NN for his assistance in 
helping me formulate this argument.  
29 It is worth keeping in mind First-Personal Dispositions applies to judgment sensitive attitudes.  So what should 
we think about a rational agent’s sharp credence like .4532?  Is this a judgment sensitive attitude? This is a good 
question and it will be addressed in the following section.   
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namely one’s own. Although having this capacity does not itself imply anything about the 
epistemic status of one’s higher order beliefs, in particular it does not imply that they are 
epistemically authoritative or privileged in any way, it is nevertheless a peculiar capacity 
insofar that a rational agent can exercise it only with respect to her own attitudes.   
Nevertheless, even if one denies that this feature of First-Personal Dispositions is sufficient to 
capture the special epistemic status of the first-person, what is crucial for the purposes of 
this essay is that the conception of first-person access embodied in First-Personal Dispositions is 
compatible with the Distinct Existence Thesis.30  
  
5. Luminosity and Fallibility 
In the previous section we saw that a rational subject with a capacity for first-person access 
will be disposed to form higher-order beliefs about the psychological attitudes she actually 
has (First-Personal Dispositions), which means that those higher-order beliefs will be true. Some 
                                                 
30 It is worth noting that, according to this view, it is much less clear that first-person access is epistemically 
distinctive when we compare it to perception. To the extent that perception is an epistemic capacity, having a 
capacity for perceptual access to some range of facts plausibly entails being disposed to form beliefs about 
them. We could then construct a parallel argument for creatures that we define as ‘perceptual subjects’, subjects 
who we define as necessarily having a capacity for perceptual access to this range of facts. If perceptual access is 
also epistemically ‘direct’ or not based on evidence, which seems extremely plausible, then it would be 
epistemically analogous to first-person access. Thus, if one thinks first-person access must be epistemically 
distinct from perceptual access, one will think First-Personal Dispositions does not secure enough epistemic 
distinctiveness. Often, Shoemaker’s self-blindness argument is cited in opposition to views that assimilate first-
person access to perception, but, as we saw earlier, that argument does not support the conclusion that such 
assimilation makes self-blindness possible.  Are there any other reasons to sharply distinguish the epistemic 
properties of first-person access from those of perception?  Perhaps, but addressing this question is beyond the 
scope of this essay. 
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philosophers might worry that this conclusion would mean that a certain range of 
psychological attitudes are self-intimating, since it claims that, as a matter of necessity, if a 
rational subject exemplifies one of these attitudes she will be disposed to believe (truly) that 
she does. In other word, some might worry that First-Personal Dispositions would make certain 
psychological attitudes luminous, at least for rational subjects. As Williamson defines it, an 
attitude is luminous 'if and only if, necessarily, whenever it obtains, one is in a position to 
know that it obtains' (2008). If one is convinced by Williamson's well-known argument 
against luminosity, then one will want to insist that no psychological attitude is luminous.31 
This is an important objection, because, as we shall see, it is partially with respect to the 
possibility of luminosity that the sort of account presented in this essay diverges from 
mainstream constitutive theories of self-knowledge. 
The reason someone might suspect that First-Personal Dispositions implies that a 
rational subject's attitudes are luminous is because she thinks that necessarily being disposed 
to believe that one exemplifies an attitude that one actually has, as First-Personal Dispositions 
claims, is either equivalent to, or at least implies being in a position to know that one 
exemplifies that attitude. That is, one might reason as follows: 
 
(5) Necessarily, for any rational subject a and psychological attitude M, (if M(a), then 
a is disposed to believe (first-personally) that M(a)). (First-Personal Dispositions) 
(6) Necessarily, if, whenever M(a), a is disposed to believe that M(a), then a is in a 
position to know that M(a).   
                                                 
31 Williamson's (2000) version of the argument is presented in terms of sensations. Offhand, one might 
therefore think it applies only to phenomenal states. However, as we will see, the argument can be extended to 
attitudes like belief (cf. Silins 2012).   
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(7) Therefore, necessarily, for any rational subject a and psychological state M, (if 
M(a), then a is in a position to know that M(a)).   
 
This argument would establish that the psychological attitudes of rational subjects are 
luminous (7).   
 In order for this argument to be credible, we would also need to assume that a’s 
disposition to believe that M(a) is sufficiently reliable.  First-Personal Dispositions claims that a 
rational agent will be disposed to believe that she exemplifies a psychological attitude 
whenever she does.  But it does not say anything about dispositions one might have to form 
beliefs in other conditions.  So, nothing in the argument excludes a from being disposed to 
form the higher-order belief that M(a) in cases where it would be false. But, if that were the 
case (6) would obviously be false. Thus, one would presumably want to insist at least that a’s 
disposition to form the belief that M(a) whenever a is in M is epistemically reliable.  
Alternatively, one could also argue that a rational subject is disposed to form accurate 
higher-order beliefs about absences of psychological attitudes, which would have the 
consequence of ensuring reliability as long as we ban explicit contradictions.     
 However, even if we were to make one of these two assumptions, (6) would be false. 
Being disposed to truly believe that one exemplifies some attitude is not sufficient for being 
in a position to know that one does. This is because we are sometimes disposed to believe 
that a certain condition obtains in cases where we would have the same disposition in very 
similar cases where the condition does not obtain. In the good case, where a is disposed to 
believe that M(a) and  M(a), her belief will be true, but the truth of this belief would be 
accidental if she were to have the same disposition in nearby cases where it is not the case 
that M(a) .  Therefore, the disposition to form a true belief about one’s psychological state in 
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the good case would not be sufficient to put one in a position to know in that case. Indeed, 
this is one of the central lessons of Williamson's argument against luminosity.  
Consider a series of times t1, t2,.....tn, such that one rationally believes that P at t1 and 
no longer believes it at tn.  Suppose further that one's degree of confidence in P gradually 
diminishes over the course of this interval. There will then be some time ti such that one's 
confidence is still high enough to count as believing that P at ti but then, at ti+1, one's 
degree of confidence drops below the threshold for believing that P. Assuming that First-
Personal Dispositions is true, we can stipulate that at ti one is disposed to believe that one 
believes that P, but, as Williamson argues, one's higher-order belief at ti would not constitute 
knowledge because it could easily have been false. It is extremely likely that one would retain 
the disposition to believe that one believes that P at ti+1, since the difference between one's 
degrees of confidence at ti and ti+1 is likely to be indistinguishable. But if one would retain 
this disposition at ti+1 (where, by hypothesis, the relevant condition does not obtain), then 
one would not be in a position to know that the relevant condition obtains in ti. So the 
disposition to believe that one has a psychological attitude whenever one does have it is not 
sufficient to put one in a position to know that one does. First-Personal Dispositions does not 
entail that any type of psychological attitude is luminous.  
This formulation of the anti-luminosity argument raises two interesting questions 
about the status of First-Personal Dispositions that are worth further consideration.  First, the 
subject in the example is not sensitive to fine-grained changes in her degrees of confidence 
between ti and ti + 1. This raises the question of whether degrees of confidence are even the 
kinds of attitudes that fall within the proprietary domain of first-person access.  If they are 
not, then it would not indicate anything about one’s capacity for first-person access if one 
did not have accurate beliefs about fine-grained credence like .4532 in the truth of P.  There 
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are certain properties of material objects that cannot be perceptually accessed, but that 
doesn’t mean our visual system is impaired.32   
Second, according to the argument, in the borderline case ti+1, the subject has a 
psychological attitude that is by hypothesis not believing that P.  We might think of it as a 
state of suspended judgment, or agnosticism about P.  But this means that prima facie the 
borderline case might look to be inconsistent with First-Personal Dispositions. The latter would 
imply that in ti+1the subject would have a disposition to believe that she is agnostic about P. 
However, according to the anti-luminosity argument, in ti + 1 the subject retains the 
disposition from ti, which is to say that she is disposed to believe that she believes that P.  This 
might be taken to indicate that something is wrong with First-Personal Dispositions.     
If we want to maintain First-Personal Dispositions, I think we should admit that in a 
borderline case like ti + 1 a subject can have two dispositions, specifically the disposition to 
believe that she believes that P and the disposition to believe that she is agnostic about P.  
Having these two dispositions is not contradictory so it is not impossible for a subject to 
have them both. There may seem to be something slightly odd about having both of these 
dispositions simultaneously, but let’s keep in mind that borderline cases are non-standard.    
To help alleviate this sense of oddity, let me clarify my conception of first-person 
access. On the sort of view presented in this essay, a rational subject must have a capacity for 
                                                 
32 If we think of credences as distinct kinds of psychological states, it may be sufficient to secure rationality that 
a subject is disposed to form true beliefs about intervals of probability.  This would require us to modify First-
Personal Dispositions somewhat but it would be in the same spirit.  But it may also be better to think of a subject’s 
degrees of confidence not as credal states but as beliefs about probabilities; see for instance the arguments 
Friedman (2013) and Sturgeon (2015). Thanks to an anonymous reader for raising the issues discussed in this 
paragraph.   
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a special mode of epistemic access to her psychological attitudes. In the previous section, I 
argued that part of having this capacity involves having a general disposition to form higher-
order beliefs about one’s attitudes. In the majority of cases where this disposition is 
exercised, a subject will actually form a higher-order belief about the attitudes she actually 
has. So, in ordinary circumstances, her higher-order beliefs will be true. However, this 
disposition is not always exercised and, like any disposition involving wholly distinct entities, 
it can also be masked.  This means that there may be cases where a rational subject will have 
the disposition to form a higher-order belief about her psychological attitude but does not 
exercise it by actually forming a belief about the attitude she has.  I would suggest that this is 
what happens in the sorts of borderline cases we find in Williamson’s anti-luminosity 
argument. If I am in a borderline case where it is very difficult to distinguish whether or not 
I believe that P or I am agnostic about P, it does not seem that odd to think I may have both 
a disposition to believe that I believe that P and a disposition to believe that I am agnostic 
about P. From this, nothing would follow about what a rational subject is disposed to believe 
in ordinary non-borderline cases. It therefore remains plausible that rational subjects are 
typically in a position to know about their own attitudes. The point of the anti-luminosity 
argument is simply to show that no psychological attitude guarantees that one will be in such 
a position.   
 By contrast, many constitutive theories do tend to maintain that at least some 
psychological attitudes are luminous (e.g., Bilgrami 2006; Coliva 2009; 2012; Shoemaker 
2012; Zimmerman, 2006). This should not be surprising. Taking one's psychological 
attitudes to be necessarily connected to one's higher order beliefs certainly makes luminosity 
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seem attractive.33 For instance, if, following Boyle, we were to think that one's attitudes are 
simply identical to one's true higher order beliefs about them it would be very hard to see how 
one could fail to be in a position to know about an attitude whenever it obtained. By 
contrast, because it does not posit any necessary relation between a subject's psychological 
attitudes and her higher-order beliefs about them, the framework presented in this essay can 
simply deny luminosity. But is this a reason to prefer it? 
 Instances of self-ignorance present one reason to be suspicious of a constitutive 
theory committed to some kind of luminosity. There is plenty of evidence demonstrating 
that individuals often have implicit psychological attitudes, which they are completely 
unaware of having (for a survey of relevant experimental work, see Jost, et. al. 2009).  To 
modify an example of Peacocke’s (1998), I might have an implicit belief that degrees from 
my own university are far superior to those from other institutions. Nevertheless, were 
someone to ask me what I believe, even if I were to consider the matter carefully, I could fail 
to be aware of this belief. The possibility of self-ignorance of one’s own attitudes suggests 
that they are not luminous.    
The luminosity of psychological attitudes is incompatible with the first clause of the 
Distinct Existence Thesis, the clause which denies that part of what it is to be in M is to believe 
(first-personally) that one is in M.  So it is possible for a constitutive theorist to reject 
                                                 
33 For a nice argument that constitutive views are nevertheless susceptible to Williamson's anti-luminosity 
argument see Srinivasan (2013).  The most popular constitutive theories discussed in the literature do not tend 
to think that only one of the two clauses of the Distinct Existence Thesis is mistaken, perhaps for the reason that 
Shoemaker (1990) gives: if we prohibit self-contradictions and first-person agnosticism, luminosity and 
infallibility seem roughly equivalent. For some other reasons to think these two notions go together, see 
Bilgrami (2006).     
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luminosity but deny the second clause of the Distinct Existence Thesis.  This sort of 
constitutive view would be committed to the claim that at least some of a subject’s higher-
order beliefs are infallible, because it would hold that part of what it is to be such a higher-order 
belief is for the subject to exemplify the embedded attitude. However, this sort of view 
would not be committed to the luminosity of any first-order psychological attitudes and so 
could easily accommodate the possibility of self-ignorance 
However, there is a parallel reason to suspicious of a constitutive theory committed 
to some sort of infallibility, namely that it seems that we can be mistaken about our own 
psychological attitudes (cf. Snowdon, 2012). This suggests that our first-personal way of 
knowing, however special it may be, is fallible. Notably our commonsense picture of positive 
self-deception is that it consists in a subject incorrectly believing that she has a particular 
attitude that she lacks.34 
Constitutive theorists are naturally aware of these putative counterexamples and seek 
to accommodate them in one of two ways.  First, several constitutive theorists restrict the 
scope of their principal thesis to a privileged kind(s) of psychological attitude. For instance, 
Bilgrami and Coliva both distinguish a special kind of attitude that they call ‘commitment’ 
(which includes ordinary beliefs and desires) and argue that there is a necessary constitutive 
connection between a subject’s psychological attitudes and her higher-order beliefs only 
when the former are ‘commitments’. (Bilgrami, 2006; cf. Coliva, 2012)  According to this 
proposal, cases of self-ignorance involve an entirely different kind of psychological state, a 
kind that, as Bilgrami says, ‘cannot possibly have the normative property of commitments’ 
(2006, pg. 315).  Similarly, Horgan and Kriegel (2007) defend an infallibility thesis, but they 
                                                 
34 Even though there are many disagreements in the literature on self-deception, theorists tend to agree that the 
explanandum involves a false higher-order belief.  For discussion, see chapter 6 of Fernandez (2013).  
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explicitly restrict it to beliefs about the phenomenal properties of one’s phenomenally 
conscious experiences. So a constitutive theorist could maintain either of the claims denied 
by the Distinct Existence Thesis, just as long as they restrict the scope of their central 
constitutive thesis. They can then insist that cases of either self-ignorance or self-error occur 
only with respect to psychological kinds that fall outside of some privileged class.35   
There is a second option available to a constitutive theorist seeking to accommodate 
self-ignorance or fallibility, which is to argue that there are additional background conditions 
on the relevant constitutive relations. According to this line of thought, it is not that the 
attitudes of which we are ignorant or mistaken make up a distinct psychological kind from 
the ones we knowingly self-ascribe, it is rather that unless certain crucial conditions are met, 
a subject’s psychological states are not necessarily connected to her having true higher-order 
beliefs about them. This is the sort of constitutive view associated with Shoemaker who 
frequently stresses that one needs rationality and conceptual capacities in addition to first-
order attitudes in order to ‘automatically’ have a true second-order belief (1994, pg. 288; cf. 
2009). A similar thought is expressed by Jane Heal’s claim that a ‘second-level belief 
contributes a necessary element to a set of conditions which are jointly sufficient for the first-
level state.’ (2001, pg. 5, emphasis added) Someone who held this sort of constitutive view 
might be thinking of the relation between a’s belief that M(a) and M(a) as a sort of 
conditional necessity. Call the relevant background conditions C. Heal’s suggestion is 
                                                 
35 Some constitutive theorists also reject the notion that self-deception involves an incorrect belief about one’s 
attitudes. For instance, both Bilgrami (2006) and Shoemaker (2009) argue that self-deceived subjects have true 
beliefs about their attitudes, but also have a belief that is inconsistent with the one they self-ascribe. I assume 
that there are cases of self-error that are not self-deception and so a constitutive theorist will need to adopt an 
additional strategy as well.   
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basically that necessarily a’s believing that M(a) plus C is sufficient for M(a) and Shoemaker 
suggests that M(a) plus C entails a believing that M(a). On either view, a subject’s 
psychological attitudes stand in a necessary constitutive relation to her higher-order beliefs 
but the holding of this relation is conditional on something else - rationality, conceptual 
sophistication, or whatever. The constitutive theorist can then argue that self-ignorance or 
error occur only when conditions C fail to hold.36   
There is no space remaining in this essay to fully discuss the various ways in which a 
constitutive theorist can try to account for cases of self-ignorance or error.  So it is 
important to understand that the challenge these cases pose for constitutive theories of self-
knowledge is an explanatory one.  It is not that constitutive views make either self-ignorance 
or error impossible; it is rather that they significantly complicate their intelligibility.  As we 
have just seen, there are a number of things a constitutive theorist could say to 
accommodate prima facie counterexamples to her theory.  However, the constitutive theorist 
is forced to turn to comparatively more complicated explanations for occurrences of self-
                                                 
36 Although I lack space to discuss the merits of this sort of proposal in detail, I think that one might 
reasonably question whether conditional necessities are really necessities. If there are some conditions in which 
an X can fail to stand in a relation to Y, then it seems like the two are not really necessarily connected. They 
may well stand in that relation in every world in which some further condition C holds, but we might question 
whether that is sufficient for necessity.  For further discussion, see Wilson (2010).  Of course, it might still be 
true that in ordinary psychological conditions, if one a is in M then a will believe that M(a) (or vice versa), but 
since this isn’t necessary it is compatible with the Distinct Existence Thesis. The fact that most people know about 
their own psychological attitudes, or are at least in a position to, is an explanandum for a theory of self-
knowledge.  Non-constitutive theories will presumably need to account for this on the basis of the reliability of 
certain contingent relations.   
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error or ignorance.37 By contrast, if we adopt a view that is compatible with the Distinct 
Existence Thesis, much simpler explanations become available. For example, one might pursue 
the promising idea that we sometimes make mistakes about our beliefs because distraction or 
fatigue masks our standing disposition (First-Personal Dispositions) to form higher-order beliefs 
about them. This is a straightforward causal explanation, but it would lose some credibility if 
we were to accept a constitutive theorist’s picture about a how subject's psychological 
attitudes are necessarily connected to her higher-order beliefs about them. That, it seems to 
me, is a significant disadvantage for constitutive theories.38 
 One reason the constitutive approach can look attractive is that we are usually not 
wrong about our psychological attitudes. Most of the time, when everything is working 
properly, we are not only in a position to know about our own psychological attitudes, but 
often do know about them.  That is a basic fact about ordinary self-knowledge that any 
theory must account for.  But an equally important truth is that each of us can sometimes be 
either wrong about or ignorant of the existence or character of our own attitudes. In this 
essay, I have tried to illustrate how we might accommodate both of these truths. If I am 
right, one can accept the Distinct Existence Thesis while nevertheless acknowledging that first-
person self-knowledge has distinctive epistemic properties and that mistakes in self-
knowledge are very rare.39  
                                                 
37 For an example of the kind of explanatory epicycles I have in mind, see Horgan and Kriegel (2007). 
38 A different objection to constitutive theories that has received a fair amount of attention is they make self-
knowledge neither a cognitive nor an epistemic ‘achievement’ (see Boghossian (1989), Fernandez (2013), 
Fricker (1998) and Peacocke (1999)). Obviously if this objection is sound, it is another reason to resist the 
constitutive approach.   
39 Acknowledgements.  
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